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Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide
Abstract
This article argues that the executive branches of governments will need to change the way
that they employ intelligence for public diplomacy in the context of military action.
Intelligence assessments that have been “politicized” through distortion and/or omission
have led to poor decision-making and a decline in public trust. These propositions are
demonstrated using the American and British public diplomacy that preceded the 2003
invasion of Iraq as a case study. This case is then compared to a second case study, the
American and British public appeals for a strike on Syria following the 2013 Ghouta
chemical attack. The article concludes by reflecting on what changes are still needed and
how the strategy of using intelligence for public diplomacy is likely to evolve in the future.
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Introduction
Intelligence can be a powerful tool for public diplomacy. It adds an element of objectivity to a
government’s public appeals, legitimizing its decisions by evidence rather than by ideology or
instinct. Loch Johnson proposes that intelligence can become “politicized” in this process, but
that in democratic regimes it will be most often countered by the influence of professional
integrity.1 Standing against this proposition is the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s
misuse of intelligence to justify the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq. This example has been
used more than any other to highlight the problematic relationship between intelligence and
public diplomacy.
This article argues that the way the executive branch uses intelligence for public diplomacy will
need to change if it is to remain effective. Rather than simply presenting the executive branch’s
own interpretation of intelligence assessments, governments will need to share more of the
unaltered assessments written by the intelligence communities themselves. The use of the term
"intelligence" refers to the assessments produced by intelligence organizations to inform
executive branch decision-making. When these assessments regarding national security issues
have been used by the executive branch to support diplomatic aims and domestic political
purposes, they have been assumed to have a degree of legitimacy, authority and seriousness that
would not be implied of documents released by non-intelligence organizations.
This perceived legitimacy has been damaged by both the Bush and Blair administration’s public
presentation of intelligence to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It demonstrated to British and
American citizens that when the executive branch presents its own version of intelligence
assessments it can lead to incomplete and/or misleading messages. Since then, the United States’
and United Kingdom’s presentation of intelligence advocating an attack on Syria has suggested
that these governments may be changing the way that they present intelligence. This will be
increasingly necessary in order to change the views of domestic audiences now skeptical of
intelligence justifications for major foreign policy decisions.
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section reviews the concept of public diplomacy
as it applies to intelligence and the problem of the “politicization of intelligence.” Next, the
article briefly examines the current literature that has criticized the use of intelligence for public
diplomacy. The third section explores the pretext for the Iraq War as a case study, examining
how American and British intelligence were referenced in public to make the case against
Saddam Hussein and how this process led to problems. Drawing principally from the British
public inquiry into the Iraq War (“the Iraq Inquiry”), the article also examines what lessons the
British government learned from that experience. The fourth section compares the use of
intelligence leading up to the Iraq War to the recent employment of intelligence assessments
advocating for military action against the Syrian regime for the 2013 sarin gas attack (a proposal
which was ultimately abandoned). The final section argues that social and technological changes
will accelerate pressure on governments to present intelligence in a more transparent manner in
the future.
1

Loch Johnson, “Sketches for a Theory of Strategic Intelligence,” in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian
(eds.), Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (London: Routledge, 2009): 46.
33

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 1

Three limitations should be acknowledged at the outset. First, the case studies assume clear
communication between the executive branches of government and their audiences. In many
cases, however, the “real” audience is the media, who reinterpret government messages for their
own audiences. Rather than exploring this second stage of communication, this article focuses on
the reaction of the media to government messages. Second, the article acknowledges that every
recipient of government information has his/her own biases and assumptions. For simplicity, this
article treats them equally and relies on public polls to measure the success of the government’s
advocacy. Differences between members of the public in their reception of government messages
would serve as an interesting follow-up study. Lastly, it should not be assumed that the
conclusions from this study would be equally applicable to countries other than the United States
and the United Kingdom. Audiences in other countries may have different standards of
transparency and perceive government messages in a different way.

Intelligence in Public Diplomacy versus the “Politicization of Intelligence”
Before examining the role of intelligence in public diplomacy, it is important to understand how
intelligence is used for public diplomacy and how it can become politicized. While some
definitions of public diplomacy focus on foreign audiences, this article focuses exclusively on
domestic ones.2 In this context, intelligence is used for public diplomacy when it is publicly
presented to support a policy decision. Public diplomacy is combined with intelligence when the
government seeks to harness the political power of an intelligence assessment to justify some
policy or action to the public. Thus, the use of intelligence in public diplomacy can be
conceptualized as falling after the “dissemination” stage of the intelligence cycle.3 The central
objective of this strategy is to change public opinion.4
Glenn Hastedt has labeled the manipulation of intelligence by the executive branch for policy
objectives as “the politicization of intelligence.”5 Of course, he acknowledges that it would be
wrong to imply that any political use of intelligence is bad. When the executive branch relies on
unaltered intelligence assessments to support a particular point of view, it does not subvert the
purpose of intelligence, it fulfills it. This treatment of intelligence could be classified as a
responsible use of intelligence for public diplomacy. However, when the executive branch alters
the assumptions behind an intelligence assessment, or worse, uses its power to remove
unfavourable information, its actions enter the realm of “the politicization of intelligence.”6
Although intelligence is used for public diplomacy in many contexts, this article focuses on
justifications of military action. When justifying a prospective or ongoing military action, these
decisions have been the main source of controversy for intelligence in public diplomacy in recent

2

Philip Seib, “Public Diplomacy and Journalism: Parallels, Ethical Issues and Practical Concerns,” American
Behavioural Scientist 52:1 (2009): 773.
3
“Security Intelligence Cycle,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, August 29, 2013, available at:
https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/bts/ccl-eng.asp.
4
Abiodun Williams, “Public Diplomacy in an Age of Faith,” in Philip Seib (ed), Toward a New Public Diplomacy
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan: 2009), 233.
5
Glenn Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: the American Experience,”
Intelligence and National Security 5 (2013): 6.
6
Ibid: 10.
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years. Public diplomacy in this context has been labeled the “presentational aspects” of war.7
Aside from the recognition that intelligence plays a role in public diplomacy, it has been
observed that the relationship between intelligence and public diplomacy is seldom discussed in
intelligence studies.8 Robert Mandel’s article is an exception, which warned that America’s use
of intelligence for public diplomacy is “spinning out of public control.”9

The Dangers of Intelligence in Public Diplomacy
Intelligence can be an effective tool to inform the public of the pros and cons of a particular
course of action, but it comes with risks. The main risk of using intelligence for public
diplomacy is that even when intelligence does not directly contradict what policymakers want it
to reveal, it will likely introduce nuances that create political difficulties.10 These nuances can
tempt policymakers to distort information when they present it to the public. As Mandel
explains, policymakers often seek “dire numbers” to justify their policy changes, which can force
analysts to deliberately distort their analysis.11 Even if distortions are not made at the analysis
stage, these numbers can still be altered before they are presented to the public.
When policymakers misrepresent intelligence it can lead to dangerous situations. Perhaps the
most extreme example is President Johnson’s instructions to the Director of Central Intelligence,
Richard Helms, to write a paper containing the points that he wanted emphasized about the
Vietnam War.12 Even when it is not deliberate, the public presentation of intelligence can lead to
the omission of important caveats and qualifications.13 It is perhaps for this reason that “there is a
natural uneasiness on the part of anyone who has worked in the intelligence business at putting
anything into the public domain.”14 Despite this discomfort, Professor Bruce Gregory pointed out
that even by 2005 there had been no calls for public diplomacy reform in the same way that there
have been calls for intelligence reform.15
One could counter here that there are many legitimate reasons to employ intelligence for public
diplomacy as well. After all, the modern conception of the “intelligence cycle” acknowledges
that intelligence priorities should be set by the executive branch based on policy concerns.16
7

“Sir Gus O’Donnell transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, January 28, 2011, available at:
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51849/20110202-odonnell-final.pdf.
8
James J Wirtz, “The Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies,” in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 23; Hastedt, “The
Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 6.
9
Robert Mandel, “On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intention,” Intelligence and National Security 24:2 (2009):
207.
10
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 162.
11
Robert Mandel, “On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intention,” Intelligence and National Security 24:2 (2009):
207.
12
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 172.
13
“Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, January 28, 2011, available at:
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51849/20110202-odonnell-final.pdf; Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 172.
14
“Sir David Omand transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, January 20, 2010, available at:
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/44187/20100120pm-omand-final.pdf.
15
Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,”
(paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and
Conflict, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2005), 31.
16
“Security Intelligence Cycle,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
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Sometimes intelligence is used as a legitimate call to rally the international community against a
violation of international law. For example, in the 1980s the United States incorporated SPOT
satellite images into a Department of Defense publication to support charges that the Soviet
Union had violated the nuclear test-ban and had biological warfare capability.17 In addition,
President Kennedy’s reliance on American intelligence gave him the confidence to both act on
the Cuban Missile Crisis and accurately communicate the threat to audiences in the United States
and abroad.18 In these cases, intelligence and public diplomacy operated harmoniously because
the policymakers were fortunate enough for the intelligence to convey what the government
wanted it to. The problem is that sometimes intelligence assessments contain nuances that the
executive branch would prefer the public did not know. This issue is explored in the case studies
below.

Case Study #1: Using the Intelligence Community to Justify the 2003 Invasion of
Iraq
This section examines the British and American uses of intelligence to justify the invasion of
Iraq in 2003. The aim of these efforts in public diplomacy was to influence American and British
public opinion.19 In addition to being one the most contemporary examples of intelligence in
public diplomacy, the government messages that preceded the invasion perhaps best exemplify
the consequences of when the executive branch misrepresents intelligence to support its own
objectives. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom may have
accomplished this objective prior to the invasion, but it was greatly overshadowed by the
revelations that emerged afterwards. This case, like the second case study, has also been chosen
because of each government’s heavy reliance on intelligence assessments to support their claims.
American Public Diplomacy Leading up to the Invasion
American attitudes leading up to the war in Iraq must be understood in the context of the
country’s unprecedented sense of vulnerability in the wake of 9/11, and the growing demands for
threat detection.20 Though the intelligence community was criticized afterwards, Len Scott
contends that 9/11 actually strengthened the legitimacy of secret intelligence.21 Since then, “war
on terrorism” has given intelligence a new level of importance in the execution of controversial
foreign policy decisions—particularly military action.22 It is for this reason that “[c]entral to the
George W. Bush administration’s strategy for building public support for the Iraq War was the
public use of intelligence” (i.e. using intelligence for public diplomacy).23

17

Peter. D. Zimmerman, “Remote sensing satellites, superpower relations and public diplomacy,” Space Policy 6:1
(1990): 23.
18
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 166.
19
John Prados and Christopher Ames (eds.), “THE IRAQ WAR - - PART III: Shaping the Debate,” The National
Security Archive at The George Washington University, October 4, 2010, available at:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/.
20
Len Scott and Peter Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” Intelligence and National
Security 19 (2004), 139.
21
Len Scott, “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Policy,” in Len V. Scott and Peter Jackson,
Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2004), 175.
22
Scott and Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” 163.
23
Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 26.
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This strategy is best illustrated by Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) on February 5, 2003. Were it a speech in a closed door
meeting, it would be nothing more than a private appeal to international governments. However,
this speech was televised and broadcast throughout the United States, preceded and followed by
media analysis.24 In that speech, Powell argued, among other things, that it had a “thick
intelligence file…on Iraq’s biological weapons…[and] mobile production facilities used to make
biological agents.”25
In addition to relying on intelligence assessments, Powell used the intelligence community itself
as a tool of legitimacy. It is no coincidence that the Director of Central Intelligence, George
Tenet, sat alongside Powell as he argued before the UNSC that Iraq posed an existential threat to
the world.26 Prefacing his allegations of Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
program and its ties to al-Qaeda, Powell underscored that “every statement I make today is
backed up by sources, solid sources…These are not assertions…What we are giving you are
facts and conclusions.”27 Recognizing the potential impact of the speech, polls were soon taken
to estimate the impact on American public opinion. A Gallup poll revealed that 79 percent of
Americans felt that Powell made either a “fairly strong” or “very strong” case for the invasion of
Iraq.28 In the short-term, the strategy appeared to have worked.
The same rhetoric was used by President Bush, who frequently referenced American intelligence
while warning domestic audiences that Saddam Hussein was poised to use chemical weapons.29
For example, in an address he gave in Cincinnati in October 2002, President Bush claimed that
“[w]e’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and
unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] that could be used to disperse chemical and biological
weapons across broad areas.”30 Like Powell’s statements, this argument relies on assessments
from the intelligence community (or at least claims to).
As we now know, many of these assertions were categorically false. What is most problematic is
that much of this rhetoric appeared to go against intelligence that the Bush administration had in
its possession. With the exception of a German-Iraqi source who later admitted that he lied, the
Bush administration’s evidence claims were mostly rooted in the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE).31 It was not publicly released until July 18, 2003, four months after
the invasion began. It began with the key judgment “that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass

24

Douglas M. McLeod, “Derelict of Duty: The American News Media, Terrorism, and the War in Iraq,” Marquette
Law Review 93:1 (2009): 119.
25
“Full Text of Colin Powell’s Speech,” The Guardian, February 5, 2003, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.
26
Ibid, 28.
27
Guardian, “Full Text of Colin Powell’s Speech” (February 5, 2003).
28
Gallup, George Horace and Jr Gallup Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2003, in George Jr. Galup
(ed.) The Gallups Poll Annual (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 51.
29
Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 28.
30
“Transcript: George Bush’s speech on Iraq,” The Guardian, October 7, 2002, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq.
31
Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd, “Defector admits to WMD lies that triggered Iraq War,” The Guardian, February
15, 2011, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.
37

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 1

destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions.”32 On the contrary,
the CIA later confirmed that Saddam Hussein had no active WMD program and no plans to
revive it (though this may have changed if sanctions had been lifted).33 Worse yet, a report by the
Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence revealed in 2006 that, contrary to Powell’s
announcement to the UNSC, the Iraqi regime “had no link to al-Qaeda.”34
So catastrophic was the invalidation of the Bush administration’s justification for the war that in
2008, the outgoing President Bush called the “intelligence failure” his “biggest regret of all the
presidency.” At the same time, however, he seemed to absolve his administration of all
responsibility, stating that he “wish[ed] the intelligence had been different.”35 There is
formidable evidence that, contrary to this claim, the intelligence itself was not the main problem.
Rather, the problem was the politicization of intelligence by his administration to make its
arguments more persuasive to both the UNSC and the public at large.
By having the ostensibly full support of intelligence officials like George Tenet, American
politicians “conveniently blamed” the intelligence community after no WMD were found and
shifted the burden from the executive branch to the public service.36 However, it has since been
revealed that there was an abundance of caveats and nuances that the Bush administration kept
hidden until after the invasion began (and even then they were not highlighted to the public).
While the October 2002 NIE did open with the inaccurate statement about Iraq’s WMD program,
it also admitted that it “lack[ed] specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD
programs.” It added that there was no “compelling case” that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons.
As if that were not enough, it included a “low confidence” assessment of when Saddam Hussein
would use WMD, whether he would attack the United States Homeland, and whether he would
cooperate with al-Qaeda.37 Professors Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim would label these
qualifying statements as “intelligence conditional.”38 The problem, as Hastedt explains, is that
the Bush administration cherry picked the intelligence that it presented to the public.39
Hastedt’s comment is only one example of the accusations mounted against the Bush
administration for the wilful ignorance of the information available, as well as the occasional
complete fabrication of intelligence. Hartnett and Stengrim point out that when Bush’s rhetoric
surrounding Iraq’s WMD program began to become scrutinized by the media, White House
Press Secretary, Scott McLlellan, simply replied that the President was “not a fact checker.” The
President, his Secretary of State, and various military officials all supported their assertions with
32

“Key Judgements [from October 2002 NIE: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction],”
Federation of American Scientists, July 18, 2003, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html.
33
Central Intelligence Agency, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,”
CIA.gov, September 30, 2004, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf.
34
“Saddam ‘had no link to al-Qaeda’,” BBC, September 9, 2006, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5328592.stm.
35
Suzanne Goldenberg, “Iraq war my biggest regret, Bush admits,” The Guardian, December 2, 2008, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/02/george-bush-iraq-interview.
36
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 125.
37
“Key Judgements,” Federation of American Scientists.
38
Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception: Reconstructing President Bush’s
Rhetoric of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 4:2 (2004): 157.
39
Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 26.
38

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.1.3

Pinkus: Intelligence and Public Diplomacy

intelligence assessments that turned out not to exist. Nevertheless, guilt was still offloaded to the
intelligence agencies when the falsities of their rhetoric came to light.40
In fairness, the intelligence community had its own problems as well. The 2004 report by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that many of the doubts within the intelligence
community about Iraq’s connections with al-Qaeda (an important counter-argument to the Bush
administration’s justification for the war) were removed from the analysis within the intelligence
community before it was disseminated to decision-makers.41 Even after this report, Director of
Central Intelligence, Porter Goss, continued to encourage members of the CIA to tailor their
assessments to support United States policymakers. In his criticism of this action, Jervis
concedes that if Goss had only been encouraging the CIA to “inform policymakers” and “support
better policy” it would have been sound practice. However, as Jervis notes, given the previous
accusations that the CIA had “undercut” President Bush, it is more likely that it was an
instruction to “reinforc[e] policies and rall[y] others to the cause.”42
In any case, one should not consider intelligence officers as completely apolitical and
independent decision-makers, since they have political biases and ideological assumptions.43
Thomas Fingar observes that analysts are not completely isolated from federal politics in the
United States.44 Even if analysts were unbiased, Fingar believes that the intelligence community
was “too timid when assessing possibilities…and insufficiently aggressive when presenting
worst-case scenarios.” He suggests that this may not have been an overt distortion to pander to
politicians, but an inadvertent tendency to frame things in such a way that may have made it
easier for politicians to misuse their assessments for political purposes.45
This tendency does not mean, however, that politicians have no choice in the matter. It should
not be discounted that American politicians’ created a “war fervor” that changed the atmosphere
in the intelligence community in the first place.46 Jervis argues that even had the intelligence
analysis been better, policymakers would have “still been able to exaggerate the intelligence to
justify the war.”47 As an example, most senior figures in the administration suggested that there
was a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and characterized the threat of WMD as
“imminent.” All of these claims were contrary to the consensus of the intelligence community.48
These misrepresentations were made possible by the government’s decision to withhold the
original intelligence assessments from the public before the war began.

40

Hartnett and Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception,” 164-169.
“Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” Senate Committee on
Intelligence, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 2d sess., July 7, 2004, available at:
http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf.
42
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 159.
43
Scott and Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” 152.
44
Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford: Stanford Security
Studies, 2011), 97.
45
Ibid, 94-95.
46
Ibid, 93.
47
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 154.
48
Ibid, 132.
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The distortion of intelligence from the analysis stage to the public diplomacy stage is best
illustrated by the Bush administration’s public allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium from
Niger, which was later proven to be false. Although this allegation was reported by British
intelligence officials, it was well known by the Bush administration that American intelligence
analysts disagreed with this.49 Most tellingly, it was later revealed that the decision to include
this intelligence came from none other than a speech writer. Without changing the content, the
White House modified the language just enough that if the allegations were proven to be false, it
could blame the CIA (which it did).50
Nevertheless, the reputations of both the executive branch and the intelligence community
suffered from the revelations that followed the Iraq invasion. According to Gallup polls, about
half of the American public blamed the Bush administration (despite its attempts to offload
blame to the intelligence community) and a little more than half expressed low or zero
confidence in the American intelligence community afterwards.51 Evidently, the image of both
the executive branch and the intelligence community had been tarnished in the United States.
Public trust would now be more difficult to obtain.
British Public Diplomacy Leading up to the Invasion
The United Kingdom’s use of intelligence leading up to the Iraq War suffered from similar
problems. With the exception of the Bush administration’s allegation of an Iraq-al-Qaeda
connection, the United Kingdom’s public allegations against Iraq were roughly a mirror image of
those made by their American counterparts. By April 2002, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair,
publicly announced that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction and was
a threat to the region and to the West. In September, he claimed that the intelligence service
“conclude[d] that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons” and that Saddam Hussein had
“active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons.”52 This claim was
repeated several months later, and Prime Minister Blair held steadfast to his assertions until over
a year into the invasion.53 In addition, the United Kingdom’s now infamous “September Dossier”
publicly asserted that Iraq was on a trajectory to developing nuclear weapons “within months,”
and had active plans to make use of weapons of mass destruction.54 The dossier has since been
accused of being sloppily assembled and plagiarizing from essays dating back to 1997.55
Significantly, all of it claimed to be supported by intelligence compiled by the joint intelligence
community (JIC).56 Like in the United States, “[British] intelligence [was] the fundamental basis
for the case [the British government] made” for the invasion of Iraq.57

49

Ibid.
Hartnett and Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception,” 174-177.
51
Gallup, Alec and Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2005 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2006), 149.
52
“Timeline: Tony Blair’s statements on weapons in Iraq,” BBC, December 12, 2009, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8409526.stm.
53
Ibid.
54
“Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,” BBC, September 24, 2002,
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/html/full_dossier.stm.
55
Hartnett and Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception,” 158.
56
“Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government.”
57
“Sir David Omand transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry.
50
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Years later, testimony from the Iraq Inquiry suggested that the Blair administration had
intentionally departed from the information given to them by the intelligence community for its
public diplomacy. Carne Ross, a former civil servant for the British Foreign Office, told the
inquiry that ministers intentionally exaggerated intelligence assessments of WMD in their efforts
at public diplomacy.58 Further, briefing papers had been “more definitive” than the intelligence
had suggested.59 Therefore, like the Bush administration’s rhetoric, the British allegations were
not necessarily fabricated, but modified to fit the policymakers’ public diplomacy strategy.
David Omand, another former British civil servant, testified that intelligence officials were
satisfied about the generalized statements that were made—it was the details that concerned
them.60
Like its American counterpart, the British intelligence community was also at fault. The now
declassified JIC assessment of September 2002 began with three key judgments that could have
easily been used to make the exaggerated claims made by the British government. The JIC
regularly presented these assessments to the Prime Minister, the senior ministers, and other
officials who dealt with policymaking.61 Unlike previous assessments, the conclusions in this
document offered few caveats. It began with the assertion that Iraq “has a chemical and
biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it.”62 It was from statements like
these that Prime Minister Blair later excused his administration by “mak[ing] the point that the
assumptions in all of [the JIC assessments] was [sic] that Saddam was committed in both the
intent and the action in developing WMD.”63 However, like President Bush’s attempt at selfexculpation, it failed. An empirical study published in 2012 suggested that there was “strong
prima facie evidence” that the war and the government’s use of intelligence had a significant
negative impact on public confidence in both the intelligence community and the government’s
presentation of intelligence.64 The authors of the study concluded that this confidence level may
negatively affect the public’s willingness to support any preventive military action in the
future.65
In recognition of this danger, the Iraq Inquiry noted that future intelligence assessments will need
to be carefully worded with as many caveats as possible.66 However, these efforts may not be
enough. As Jervis observed, even had the intelligence been better, politicians could have still
ignored caveats and exaggerated claims to increase public support for the war.67 One way of
avoiding this would be to submit the full intelligence assessment to government ministers, rather
58

“Carne Ross: Testimony to the Chilcot Inquiry,” The Iraq Inquiry, July 12, 2012, available at:
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/47534/carne-ross-statement.pdf.
59
“Rt Hon. The Lord Prescott Transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, July 30, 2010, available at:
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than submitting something that was for a “marketing purpose.” This could reduce the danger of
losing caveats when the information is presented to the public.68 Failing that, the obvious
alternative would be to disclose the intelligence assessments directly to the public, as was done
after the 2013 chemical attack in Syria.

Case Study #2: Public Diplomacy after the 2013 Syrian Chemical Attack
The British and American intelligence communities’ willingness to reform was tested after the
2013 Syrian chemical attack, when Western countries once again publicly presented intelligence
in an attempt to persuade the public that a military strike on Syria was in order. This section
examines the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s response, comparing their use of
intelligence for public diplomacy to what was used prior to the invasion of Iraq. It appears that
while the United Kingdom has become more willing to share original intelligence assessments,
the United States continues to limit its disclosure to the executive branch’s own interpretation of
the intelligence.
The Attack
On August 21, 2013, the rebel-held Eastern Ghouta neighbourhood just outside of Damascus was
shelled by surface-to-surface rockets, which the UN later concluded contained sarin gas. The
casualties included civilians, with children among them.69 A debate immediately began as to
what the international response should be.
The United States’ Response
Having previously marked the use of chemical weapons as a “red line”, President Obama’s
administration reacted to the event with a sense of obligation.70 Initial intelligence assessments
appeared to stress that there was no conclusive proof of what exactly happened, but within a
week of the attack, the Obama administration felt comfortable establishing a timeline.71 The
government’s public assessment expressed a “high degree of confidence” that the Syrian
government had carried out the attack. It claimed that the information had been corroborated by
satellites, discussed the symptoms of the victims, and gave a casualty estimate. It also mentioned,
however, that additional intelligence would need to remain classified.72 At no point did the
Obama administration address the fact that the German BND had publicly asserted that Assad
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did not personally order the attack (based on its own signals intelligence).73 “Intelligence
conditional” appeared to be absent once again.
Public statements made on the attack also have parallels to the Iraq case. In a similar fashion to
Powell’s 2003 speech to the UNSC, the intelligence summary was cited by Secretary of State
John Kerry in a televised briefing the same month, who argued that a military response was
justified.74 As well, United States Senator Bob Casey emerged from an intelligence briefing
announcing that he now had evidence “of the national security imperative in Syria and the need
to authorize the limited use of force.”75
At the same time, there were marked differences between the Obama administration’s approach
to Syria and the Bush administration’s approach leading up to the Iraq invasion. For one thing, it
should be noted that earlier reports on the use of chlorine gas in Syria were actually played down
by the Obama administration, rather than using it as evidence to support an attack.76 Clearly
recognizing the parallel with Iraq, President Obama made it clear to the public that only “rock
solid” intelligence would justify American intervention in the conflict.77
Paradoxically, United States officials made numerous claims about the 2013 gas attack without
invoking the support of the intelligence community at all. For instance, Jay Carney concluded
that the details of the event were simply “abundantly obvious.”78 Susan Rice, a key figure in the
United States’ public diplomacy strategy, seemed uninterested in what the intelligence had to
say. She assumed that it could not tell her anything that she did not already know.79 This may
explain why rather than releasing an NIE, a document that would have been drafted by the
intelligence community, the White House chose to release a statement themselves. This was
done despite the fact that members of Congress have requested a record number of NIEs in the
last few years.80
In the end, the Obama administration’s strategy was poorly received. Polls taken after the
government’s assessment was released reflected strong opposition to the proposed strike.
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Political analysts found the assessment disingenuous and unconvincing.81 One could argue that
there is hypocrisy in insisting on “rock solid” intelligence for action and then demanding action
without proving any of the intelligence itself. The public’s reaction to the government’s
interpretation of the intelligence should be unsurprising, given that the problems from the Iraq
War emerged from the suppression and distortion of important caveats in the intelligence.
The United Kingdom’s Response
In contrast, the United Kingdom decided to change its approach and share more intelligence
directly with the public. The British administration did not rely on a government dossier as it did
before the Iraq War. Despite having renounced the practice of publicly releasing intelligence
papers several years earlier, the British executive branch made the rare move of releasing the full
JIC assessment of the attack. This was done in the aim of influencing both politicians and the
broader public to support military action.82 While its reliance on intelligence differed from the
Americans, the JIC’s statement came to roughly the same conclusions. It stressed that the
decision was made “with the highest possible level of certainty.” Reminding the public that it
had access to highly sensitive intelligence, it claimed that it had high confidence in everything—
a except for the regime’s motivation.83 Perhaps recalling the dire consequences of underplaying
important caveats leading up to the Iraq War, the JIC placed its hesitations front and center.
In spite of this decision, it is clear that the public was unimpressed by the JIC’s statement. The
Guardian criticized the report almost immediately, accusing it of having a “striking lack of
scientific evidence” that “adds nothing to informed speculation.” It quoted chemical weapons
experts who cited the lack of “hard facts”, and even cast doubts on whether chemical weapons
were used at all. Ironically, however, the newspaper most criticized the JIC for its inclusion of
caveats regarding the Syrian government’s motivation, suggesting that this invalidated the rest of
the intelligence that was given.84 In the end, the government’s proposal to pursue action in Syria
was rejected by British Parliament.85
The public’s reaction and the political result may have left the British government disappointed,
but it arguably left them which much more credibility. It is less likely than it was in the case of
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Iraq that the government would be accused of misrepresenting intelligence to mislead the public.
It allowed members of the public to form an informed opinion based on all the facts that were
available and avoid taking military action for faulty reasons. This could lay groundwork for a
more trusting British public the next time it is faced with the prospect of preventive military
action.

Possibilities for the Future
Regardless of the reforms implemented to the use of intelligence for public diplomacy, this
strategy will inevitably continue in the future. Though illustrative of some of the changes in
practice since Iraq, it would be imprudent to assume that the Syrian example categorically
reflects how governments will present intelligence in the future. In response to the contentious
Iranian nuclear issue, the White House has declassified as much intelligence as possible. Fingar
believes that the United States government now releases this information ahead of time to make
sure that it has the power to contextualize the intelligence before someone else does it first.86
This danger is reflected in the recent WikiLeaks scandal. In that case, a third party obtained
sensitive American intelligence and released it to the public against the government’s wishes.
One of these leaks revealed North Korea’s sale of nineteen missiles to Iran. Since the raw
intelligence was released by WikiLeaks, the media speculated on the implications of this
intelligence and contextualized it themselves, rather than waiting for the government to explain
it.87
The concern about who gets to interpret intelligence may also reflect a broader change in the
dissemination of intelligence to the public. Richard Aldrich and John Kasuku predict that
“intelligence in the Twitter age will not be owned by government.”88 Because the form of
communicating intelligence to the public is so important, this may change the way that
intelligence is used for public diplomacy. In the past, Americans could be swayed by government
communications conveyed through mainstream media, where they were almost assured front
page coverage.89 Now, however, thanks to the ubiquity of online news, blogs, and social media,
it may help spread doubt even when the government expresses a high degree of confidence, as
was the case in Syria. This may accelerate the British executive branch’s attempts to use
intelligence more transparently and force its American counterpart to follow suit. While a certain
amount of information may always need to be withheld for security reasons, the Syrian case
study above demonstrates that greater transparency is possible.

Conclusion
In the past, governments may have believed that it was in their interest to present only the
intelligence that supported their policy objectives and pay less attention to the caveats contained
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in intelligence assessments. However, the United Kingdom’s implementation of some of the
lessons learned from the Iraq Inquiry suggests that governments may be willing to change. In
order to regain the public’s trust, both the United States and the United Kingdom will need to
present intelligence in a more transparent fashion when it is used for public diplomacy.
Reports and polls by the media suggest that the strategy of using intelligence in public diplomacy
has been tarnished. Ultimately, it seems unavoidable that the intelligence will be politicized to a
certain degree in order to support policy objectives. However, governments may be able to
increase public confidence in the use of intelligence for public diplomacy if its executive
branches are willing to share intelligence assessments more transparently, including those
aspects which shed the course of action they are advocating for in an unfavourable light.
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